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POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION*
ERIC TALBOT JENSEN**
I am very happy to be here today sitting on this panel. Post-conflict
reconstruction is an extremely important topic and is becoming more
important to the military given recent conflicts.
On November 28, 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued
Directive 3000.05 entitled Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.' The directive
"provides guidance on stability operations"2 and "establishes DoD policy
and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning,
training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations."3 The
directive defines stability operations as "military and civilian activities
conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or
maintain order in States and regions."4 Post-conflict reconstruction would
* This essay is adapted from a speech given at the New England Journal of
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Non-State Actor" on Feb. 23, 2007 at New England School of Law, Boston, MA.
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1. Dep't of Def. Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition,
and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Nov. 28, 2005), available at http://www.dtic.
mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf.
2. Id. at11.1.
3. Id. at 1.2.
4. Id. at 13.1.
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obviously fit within this definition. Therefore, the military has a role in
post-conflict reconstruction. More pointedly, the directive further states
that:
stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the
Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and
support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat
operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across
all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training,
education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel,
facilities, and planning.5
This is a pretty strong statement about the military's role in stability
operations. I am sure that you have all heard the mantra that the mission of
the United States' military is to fight and win the nation's wars. I don't
think that this new policy changes that mission, but I do think it may
demand a broader understanding of what the "nation's wars" means.
Included within that mission are post-conflict reconstruction and other
stability operations.
In practical terms, this means learning how to create an effective
judicial system is as important as tank gunnery, establishing a legitimate
police force is as vital as conducting an ambush and ensuring a fair and
humane prison system is as necessary as knowing how to supply food, fuel
and ammunition to forces in battle. This point is made in the Army's new
manual on counterinsurgency operations.6
On the other hand, by making it a core mission, that is not to say that
the military. is always the right organization to do everything needed.
While confirming that the "U.S. military forces shall be prepared to
perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians
cannot do so,"7 the Directive also concedes that "many stability operations
tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian
professionals."8 This point becomes self-evident considering the breadth of
requirements in a post-conflict reconstruction environment. For example,
the DOD Directive lists one of the stability operations tasks as "reviv[ing]
or build[ing] the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven,
bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure." 9
5. Id. at 4.1.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY 2-1 (Dec. 15,
2006).
7. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, supra note 1, at 1 4.3.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1 4.3.2; see also Peter W. Chiarelli & Patrick R. Michaelis, Winning the Peace:
The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations, Mil. Rev., Jul.-Aug. 2005
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The United States military does not have a spot for a soldier with the job
title of "entrepreneur educator."
In the Army, we do have Civil Affairs units, which often contain
people both on active duty and in the Reserves who have a multitude of
practical skills that are and have been a great help in stability operations,
including those taking place within Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there
are a limited number of these skilled individuals and they bring what skills
they have to the mission and can not be made to order. As a matter of
training it is much easier to train a soldier on running a platoon of infantry
soldiers than it is to train a soldier on running a city sanitation system.
Those are skills that are taught and learned in the civil sector.
This problem is highlighted by a recent exchange between Secretary
of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Rice. Secretary Gates was recently
questioned about a memo sent by the State Department asking the DoD to
temporarily fill more than one third of the Iraq slots allocated to the State
Department.10 Secretary Gates responded by saying "if you were troubled
by the memo, that was mild compared to my reaction when I saw it."" He
argued that the DoD has neither sufficient personnel to do all the military
jobs needed in Iraq nor all the skill sets required to do so.
Unfortunately, despite the need for greater civilian involvement in
Iraq and similar situations, the State Department is not manned
appropriately for this mission either. Secretary Rice stated before Congress,
"The problem is the State Department doesn't have agronomists and
engineers and city planners. No foreign service in the world has those
people."l 2 Nevertheless, National Security Presidential Directive 44 makes
the Department of State the "focal point" for coordinated U.S. efforts in
this area and gives them the task to "coordinate and lead integrated U.S.
government efforts."' 3
Obviously, not every post-conflict reconstruction situation will be like
(discussing the It Cavalry Division's civil military operations, including attempts to
spur local business and investment).
10. Helene Cooper, Where U.S. Diplomats Fear to Tread; Call for Increased Civilian
Role in Hostile Areas Met with Unease, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 8, 2007, at 1,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/08/news/diplo.php.
11. Michele Kelemen, Morning Edition: Reconstruction Teams at Premium in Iraq (NPR
radio broadcast Feb. 9, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld=7299387.
12. Id. see also Helene Cooper, Blame (Blank) for Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, at 1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/weekinreview/1lcooper.html?fta=
y.
13. Nat'l Sec. Pres. Dir. No. 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning
Reconstruction and Stabilization 2 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html.
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Iraq, but it may be one of the more difficult situations because of the nature
of the security environment. If we can figure out how to make our efforts
work in Iraq against an active and virulent insurgency, we should have
great success in more permissive environments. And the only way to
actually have success is a truly coordinated effort from all government
agencies, providing what capabilities they have.
Now, let me give some examples of what the Army can bring to the
post-conflict reconstruction problem. I have previously mentioned the Civil
Affairs units and the amazing skills they provide. Civil Affairs units were
active in Haitil 4 and Bosnia'5 as well as Iraq and Afghanistan.16 They have
performed vital missions from organizing all nongovernmental
organization actions within a country to training judiciary and police and
protecting local businesses from graft and illegal taxes. In response to
current missions, as well as to the new Directive, the Army is reexamining
our efforts in Civil Affairs and trying to make it better. The issuance of a
new doctrinal manual, Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations,7
highlights this renewed emphasis.
In the new manual, Civil Affairs units are charged with "provid[ing]
the military commander with expertise on the civil component of the
operational environment." 8 They focus on five core tasks: Populace and
Resources Control, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Civil Information
Management, Nation Assistance, and Support to Civil Administration.19
As you can see, they have a broad mission, and the Army is trying to
expand its capabilities to meet those missions, not only in the Reserves
where the vast majority of the Civil Affairs personnel currently reside, but
also by increasing the number of active duty Civil Affairs soldiers.
However, this expanded capability will take time to build. In the
interim within the rule of law area, the Army is often using Judge
Advocates to fill the gaps, especially at division-sized units and smaller.
For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, Judge Advocates have been
intricately involved in the rebuilding of the judicial process, to include
courts, police and prisons. 2 0 They were relied on to know and understand
14. CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, FORGED IN THE FIRE: LEGAL LESSONS
LEARNED DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS 1994-2006, 11-14 (Sept. 1, 2006)
[hereinafter FORGED IN THE FIRE].
15. Id. at 14-16.
16. Id. at 23.
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-05.40, CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
(Sept. 2006).
18. Id. at 1-1.
19. Id. at 1-3.
20. CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM
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local governance and its processes21 and to be the expert on environmental
compliance.2 2 Judge Advocates were also used to conduct liaison with local
leaders, to synchronize the commander's efforts with other governmental
and nongovernmental agencies and to assist in the establishment and
functioning of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.2 3 These past efforts by
Judge Advocates and a continuing need for Judge Advocates who are
trained and capable or accomplishing these tasks prompted the Center for
Law and Military Operations and U.S. Joint Forces Command to issue the
"Rule of Law Handbook: A Practitioner's Guide for Judge Advocates." 24
Judge Advocates have obviously not been the only military members
involved in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Units have approached
the problems in their areas in innovative and thoughtful ways. Using the
money initially confiscated from the Hussein regime, the Commander's
Emergency Response Program (CERP) was initiated. This program
allowed commanders to carry out infrastructure and other projects such as
sewer and trash clean-up in their local areas, and employ local Iraqis and
Afghans in the process. On a broader scale, money was used to repair
power systems and get power and water back into neighborhoods that were
without those resources. All of these efforts are beyond the normal scope of
what many military personnel thought their traditional military tasks were.
But these were things that needed to be done and no one else was there to
do them.
While I believe the Judge Advocates and others have performed
marvelously, it is still worth reflecting if they are the right people to do this
work, or even if the rejuvenated Civil Affairs units are the right people to
do this work. There is no doubt that the requirements for interaction with
the local populace will always be a part of the mission when the U.S. goes
into a post-conflict situation. What is the best way to handle that? Should
the Army put understanding how to run a city sanitation system on the
same level with performing well at tank gunnery? Is it the best use of
resources to take slots within the military that would otherwise be used for
military policemen or infantryman and turn them into civil affairs experts?
Alternatively, should we rely on the State Department's system of
incentives and cash bonuses to draw enough volunteers? Or should we try
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, VOLUME II: FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS 20-61 (Sept. 1,
2005).
21. Id. at 112-14.
22. Id. at 177-78.
23. FORGED IN THE FIRE supra note 14, at 122-32.
24. CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS & JOINT FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE,
RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES (July
2007).
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something else, such as the civilian reserve corps? In the absence of other
options, the military will do its best to fill the gap, but I think the question
of whether that is the wisest course of action in the long run deserves some
attention.
